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ASIAN VALUES: A PERTINENT CONCEPT TO EXPLAIN
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA?
DONG HYEON JUNG
(DEPT. O F E C O N O M I C S , P U S A N N A T I O N A L U N I V E R S I T Y , S O U T H K O R E A )
DHYJUNG@YAHOO.COM

I. Introduction: Debates on Asian Values
Some time after the economic crisis of East Asia in 1997, debates
over Asian Values (of Confucian origin) have emerged again in Korea,
many of them about how much Asian Values are responsible for successful economic development in Korea and other East Asian countries.
These debates, to some degree, are an answer to Western criticism of
Asian Values, which are seen to be responsible for "crony capitalism"
and the consequences of the Asian economic crisis. Asian Values, for
which a clear definition is not yet available, is generally conceived as a
combination of a strong state and political authority, education and selfcultivation, frugality and thrift, an ethic of hard work and labor discipline, social harmony and group-responsibility—in short, as a form of
social civility which shows distinctive features of Confucianism.
These debates have created a large "resonance" in the understanding of Asian Values, by bringing fresh ideas and supportive criticism, as
well as a diversity of opinion. I believe this is partly because of a prolonged and deep-rooted pessimistic inferiority complex that a majority
of Koreans possess. People who used to live below the poverty line for
so many hundreds of years, envious of Western wealth, now find themselves doing well. If their new prosperity is due to their Confucian values, they would be pleased to hear it.
Max Weber's influential works, for example, The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, which proposed Protestantism as an important cause for the rise of Capitalism, contended that no capitalistic
development would ever take place in China (and other Confucian
countries in East Asia). This left East Asian people depressed.
Weber found no hope in a society where a single despot at the summit monopolizes the direction of government via many levels of hierarchy beneath him, and where religious as well as family matters are regulated by state laws, and where the individual is self-effacing. It was
Confucianism that lay behind this and that had kept China (and other
East Asian countries) unchanged for thousands of years until its col-
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lapse under the impact of the West.
Such a negative perception of Confucian culture, and pessimism
for the future of East Asian countries, had been frequently inculcated by
leaders and intellectuals in this part of the world through the prior years
of industrialization carried out under a nationwide campaign for deConfucianization and pro-Westemization.
Considering the above, it may be understandable that scholars of
the regions would try to refute Weber's hypothesis when the countries
demonstrated themselves to be developed out of Confucian mire.'
Nevertheless, their efforts to discard Weber's prejudice, ironically
enough, produced another prejudice again, entrenching them in a similar contradictory logic.
A further reason for the resonance may be the unreliable policy of
the United States today. The American government repressively
requires that even Third World countries implement neoliberal policies
of free trade. On the other hand, it outrageously imposes heavy tariffs
on the import of steel products. USTR (The office of the U. S. Trade
Representatives) demands free trade and fair competition between
countries, but at the same time, the Bush administration has endorsed a
bill to provide a huge subsidy to American farmers, an outright violation. This would lead the Korean public to be sympathetic to the ideas
of anyone who emphasizes independent and self-oriented Asian identity, differentiated from the Western standards or norms.
II. Proponents of Asian Values and their Arguments
Roderick MacFarquhar's article entitled "The Post-Confucian
Challenge" 2 was a notable reversal of conventionally negative interpretation of Confucianism in the West. He cited higher expenditure for
children's education and the Confucian concept of loyalty, obedience
and filial piety as factors that help bring success in Japan, Taiwan and
Korea. He also paid keen attention to the culture in which the individual is less important than the collective or the company. Within
"Confucian" culture emphasizing group-mentality, "corporate spirit"
could readily be created, whereas the "'organization man or corporate
spirit" might have somewhat repellent connotations in the West.
Ezra Vogel3 attributes the cause of the success of Japan to this
background and has chided American businesses for their failure to
emulate the Asian (Japanese) model. Herman Kahn basically, shares the
idea.4
Tu Wei-Ming 5, David Hall and Roger Ames 6 focus on the exces-
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sive individualism and pursuance of materialistic well-being in Western
Societies. This has brought moral decline and value-absent societies,
the dismantling of families and atomization of the community. They try
to find alternative solutions derived from the non-individualistic Asian
Values as a solution for such problematic situations of the West.
Chung Hoon Lee explains that the hierarchical social norm of
Confucianism played a positive role in making "government-big business partnership model" of Korea the engine of rapid economic growth.
He says, "For large private enterprises to accept the role of junior partner and for government to play the senior partner, both parties must
accept their respective role as a social norm. This, an efficient institution in achieving successful development, was realized because of the
advantage of hierarchy." 7
Two prominent Asian politicians, Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir
Mohamad, also triggered heated controversies over Asian Values.
Central themes of Lee (Senior Prime Minister of Singapore) concerning
Asian Values lie in the following two points:8 1) his insistence that
America not foist its system indiscriminately on societies in which it
would not work, and 2) his emphasis on strong and healthy family ties.
There is a Chinese aphorism which encapsulates this idea: Xiushen
quijia zhiguo pingtianxia. Xiushen means look after yourself, cultivate
yourself, do everything to make yourself useful; Qijia, look after the
family; Zhiguo. look after your country; Pingtianxia, all is peaceful
It
under heaven. We have a whole people immersed in these beliefs
is the basic concept of our civilization. Government will come, government will go, but this endures. We start with self-reliance. In the West
today it is the opposite.
It is well known that Mahathir, the former Prime Minister of
Malaysia, openly attacked American speculative hedge funds as culprits
of the East Asian economic crisis and refused the implementation of
economic reforms required by IMF on the ground that their recipe does
not fit Malaysian soil.
Quite a number of young Korean scholars have embraced the basic
ideas above, celebrating them as a source of distinctive strength in East
Asian societies; but few of them so far have led to further refinement or
to empirical evidence showing systematically how Asian Values have
contributed to successful development. 9
III. Have Asian Values Buttressed Development?
Education in East Asia.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2004

3

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 51 [2004], No. 51, Art. 8
110

Comparative Civilizations Review

The area within "Asian Values" most commonly singled out by
their proponents as contributing to rapid economic development is education. Indeed, Confucian societies invest more resources in education
— and the literacy rate in these societies is much higher (almost 100%
in Korea) — than is the case in many other cultures. Korean parents have
been extraordinarily dedicated to their children's education. However, it
is not possible to achieve 100% literacy rate in any country by parents'
dedication alone. The answer ought to be found, I would say, in the government's policy to allocate more resources in education and its ability
to have the policy enforced effectively.
Even so, I wonder how proponents of "Asian Values" can respond
to critics contending that Confucian countries are suffering from outdated methods of education today. Recent issues of the weekly magazine
The Economist report as follows:
Throughout the millennia, students of all ages in China have had to
endure the miseries of learning by rote. Teachers have stifled creativity in the pursuit of the accumulation of facts, and parents have forced
children to spend mind-numbing hours cramming for exams
Several other countries in East Asia, including Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan are grappling with similar problems. 10

In another article, an author writes:
Passing the examinations to get a university place can be tough in
some cases - the so-called 'examination hell'- but once a student gets
there, the next four years may involve very little work. Even at top
universities, poor attendance often goes unchecked. Lectures are
monotonous and discussions rare. Assignments are set, but essays,
once handed in, may not find their way back to students.... Corporate
recruiters complain about the falling quality of university graduates.
... Companies need to shoulder some blame for falling standards.
Their policy has been to seek conscientious graduates who will buckle down and obediently follow orders."

What hinders educational reform in Korea is the Confucian norm
of social hierarchy that makes people excessively interested in achieving status. Education may be the only channel, under the Confucian
meritocracy, for mobility. People are anxious for their children to pass
the entrance examinations of universities of the best reputation and to
do well in the national examinations. They want them to become high
ranking government officials or law professionals. They regard formal
education to be just training courses for the students to get good grades
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in the examinations, not for creativity or productivity. Many of those
who are afraid of the baneful sides of Korean education either emigrate
for their children's better education or let their children study in other
countries.
Confucian Ethics and Social Norms.
Family and self-cultivation, hierarchy, labor discipline, obedience,
social civility and harmony, etc., perceived as Confucian ethics, are
mostly related to patriarchal authority and non-individualistic groupmentality. These are vital attributes of Confucianism. Traditional
Confucian education was suited to a political culture that required citizens to submit blindly to authority. The nature of Confucianism itself
evokes the past and bars capitalistic development rather than promoting
it. If education in Confucian societies has ever contributed to development, it may be because the process of acculturation has been successful in modifying it, ameliorating those innately anti-capitalistic facets
antithetical to economic development. If anything, the new education
initiated by the American Military Government in Korea during the
years 1945-1948 did that. Education of all gradations has undergone
correspondingly enormous changes.12
However, these changes were not enough to lead the majority of the
people to be adaptive to the new circumstances of the Economic
Development Plan launched in 1962. What Park Chung Hee's government did to cope with this bottleneck was to begin nationwide campaigns, the "Enlightenment Movement" in the 1960s and the "New
Community Movement" in the late 1970s. The main focus of these
movements was to eradicate the remnants of Confucian relics.
This general point can be illustrated by a particular example showing why the "Asian Values" thesis is untenable:
The Korean soccer team, which had never made even one of the 16
finalists until then, achieved a resplendent record of being Quarter
Finalists at the World Cup games in June 2003, thanks, mainly, to excellent leadership by a distinguished coach Guus Hiddink. His prescription, during his one-year tenure, eliminated favoritism in player recruiting and halted the outdated custom of seniority among players as well
as the Confucian style of Spartan, group-oriented training. His recruiting was based on merit and potentiality and his training on scientific
data, dismissing old vestiges of revering age and a long career. His outstanding performance clearly showed that cronyism" had led the society and communities to be inorganic.
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It also substantiates that the following opinion of Chung Hoon
Lee14 is merely a fictitious and unrealistic perception of substance. He
says in his paper, "...it would appear that the Confucian ethos that fosters loyalty, dedication, responsibility, and commitment and intensifies
identification with the organization and one's role in the organization
would limit opportunistic behavior more than the Western individualism."
As commented previously, Lee argues that Korea's development
was based on a "government-business partnership model," and hierarchical social norms made Korean businesses willing to accept an obedient, junior partnership to government's senior partnership. But if a government has every power to provide business with opportunities of
windfall profit, any businesses of the world over would also be willing
to be obedient and accept the status of junior partner to their government, even without the norm of a hierarchical system.
This is what happened during the rapid-growth years of the 1960s
to 1980s in Korea. The Korean government's central role was allocating
financial resources to selected business and this financial support generated windfall profits. Those that were fortunate enough to win the
government's favor and support became chaebols, the Korean conglomerates.
This government-guiding development model was followed by a
lack of transparency, accountability and discipline, bringing the
arrangement into widespread disrepute. The economy became vulnerable to unfavorable changes of the environment and Korea suffered a lot
during the Asian economic crisis because of this. The Confucian type of
hierarchical relationship between bureaucrats and businessmen provided very good circumstances to bring corruption and social impunity.
Quasi-internal organizations, which Lee considers good and efficient institutions, often ended up as convenient channels, in reality, for
padding the bank accounts of the politicians in charge. This assumption
was demonstrated to be true when the astounding slush fund scandals
erupted in late 2003 and early 2004 in Korea. According to the investigation, the amount of illegal funds donated by big businesses to political parties at the time of presidential election in 2002 was astronomical.
Businessmen are not saints or moral reformers. They are pragmatists.
They try to maximize business opportunities and profits within the values and political systems in which they live. If they hear that a bureaucrat listens to legal arguments, they will use legal arguments. If a politi-
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cian wants a percentage of every deal, business will offer that percentage.
Moreover, Lee and other Korean proponents ignore what happened
in 18th century Korea. Some new ideas, seeking economic growth and
development and challenging the traditionalist Confucian ideology budded, off and on, from the eighteenth century on, only to be suppressed.
Rudimentary forms of a capitalistic merchant class began to emerge,
never to become a significant indigenous force toward the development
of modern capitalism. Even some signs of reform in the agricultural sector appeared, to be wiped out eventually." Confucian ideology of that
time backed the policies and measures that wiped out the changes.
The Cost of Confucian Ideology.
Proponents of Asian Values assume that all the countries of East
Asia share very similar cultures. This supposition is simply false.
A good example of such overgeneralization appears in Roderic
MacFarquhar's 16 thesis concerning "corporate spirit" allegedly exhibited in countries subscribing to "Asian Values." Confucianism itself
varies from country to country, because classical Confucianism from
China underwent remarkable changes into diverse versions when it was
transplanted in neighbouring countries.
Thus the corporate spirit MacFarquhar celebrates, encouraging
workers to show extreme allegiance to the company they belong to and
a practice that leads not too rarely to karoshi (overwork death), is not
easily found in countries other than in Japan. Its continuance was possible in Japan because of the sophisticated design of the uniquely
Japanese institution of lifetime employment and seniority system, under
which the allegiance of workers to their corporation is adequately
rewarded.
A further facet of MacFarquhar's thesis concerning obedience as an
advantageous element of "Asian Values" for development deserves criticism. To some degree, obedience played a positive role in growth. For
example, if asked for extra-vigilance work in case of short delivery of
export shipping, obedient employees would comply easily. And this is
what happened at the incipient stage of Korean industrialization. But
consistent demands by companies for extra work with no compensation
or reward ended up with either violent revolts or slowdown sabotages.
The following statement made by a political scientist who studied laborunion leaders in Korea in early 1970s gives us some suggestions.17
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It is indeed questionable whether industrial workers will continue to
accept the argument that they should endure sacrifices for the
supreme national interest of uninterrupted economic growth. They
might even feel that successful economic progress is irrelevant to
them unless its benefits are widely and fairly shared by them on the
basis of social justice and political democracy.

One of the salient roles of Confucianism had been letting aristocrats exert harsh control over common people and menials and justifying the legitimacy of such control. This long lasting value induced
Korean employers (and the government) to practice harsh and mthless
oppression of workers for over three decades from the 1960s-1980s.
While the workers had been suppressed excessively, they had been
honed to become extreme militants. Militant labor unions and the rigidity of labor market are among the critical reasons that the Korean economy has remained stagnant for the past many years.
Lee Kuan Yew is known as champion of "Asian Values." He himself declares as much, but he is really not. His claim of "fulfilling social
obligation by family; and the assertion that a system does not fit all
countries indiscriminately," sounds plausible if we consider the points
as phenomena in less modem societies. He accepts gaps and differences
between modem (industrialized) and less modem (less industrialized)
societies. Except on these points, he is not different from today's
Western market-principle-oriented economists. His diagnosis of the
Asian crisis (his interview with one of the daily newspapers in Korea,
Jungang Ilbo, March 6, 1998) and his perception of market economies
(Culture is Destiny — In defense of Asian Values) verify that.18
The resentment Mahathir exhibited toward Western norms peaked
in his open criticism of US financial investors as well as in his ignoring
the recipe that the IMF (International Monetary Fund) suggested. His
repudiation looked conspicuous when many other countries kowtowed
at the knee of IMF. And his policy and decisions seemed, contrary to
widespread anticipation of falling into default or moratorium, to be
working effectively in Malaysia. This was because Malaysia had
enough energy and other natural resources to avert immediate default or
moratorium. Moreover, the tough measures of austerity needed to meet
IMF's requirements should have been a political burden for him as they
would have most likely hit the majority Malaysian ethnic group who
were his stronghold voter bank.
Now, years later, however, Malaysia is paying a high price for the
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skewed policy he adopted under the flag of Asian Values: Malaysian
economic recovery and growth since then has been slow due to the
delayed restructuring and economic reform.
Francis Fukuyama identifies the low level of trust as a critical
weakness of East Asian countries, since he believes economic success
is determined by the moral bonds of social trust within a culture19. He
argues that mistrust (and lack of delegation), prevailing in East Asian
countries, originated from the Confucian hierarchy which lacks superior-to-subordinate obligations. He says this is a distinctive characteristic
of East Asian hierarchies, one that differentiates them from other cultures.20 Yamakishi Toshio from the University of Hokaido, Japan, illustrates that trust-building requires risk-taking and people living in the
collectivist societies of Confucian culture are not prepared for this. He
says people of a collectivist society (based on group-mentality) feel
comfortable when they are with insiders because they become tolerant
of each other and this facilitates transactions and helps to reduce the
cost. This friendly behavior among insiders, however, turns to be hostile to the outsiders no matter how honest or competent they are.21
Oh shares the opinion: "the Confucian clan system dictated a narrow range of loyalty, Koreans have developed no sense of obligation to
outsiders. As a result, they are good at competition, ruthless in opposition, and very poor at compromise and cooperation. ... Confucian society is in reality ruled by two sets of standards, family standards and public standards. Adherence to family standards, which take precedence,
often requires hypocrisy in the public domain, with lying an accepted
means of protecting the family..."22
The clear implication of these contentions is that Confucian culture
created a low level of trust in Confucian societies and that this does not
promote economic progress.
IV. If not Asian Values, What is the Answer?
Economic development is fulfilled by improving productivity,
which is an outcome of efficiency and hard work. Production is embodied in the combination of labor, capital and technology. Why do big
businesses, in general, maintain higher productivity than small or medium businesses? That is because the productive processes of big business
are more efficient and elaborately organized to take advantage of
economies of scale.
This is not a matter of values or culture, but matter of a manager's
insight, know-how, discipline, and stringent surveillance. Likewise, the
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economic development of a society is a fruit of having right institutions
in place to raise efficiency, sound policies, and governmental leaders
committed to enforcing them. Development in Korea accelerated during
Park Chung Hee's administration. Rapid development arose in a previously unproductive society with the same culture and values only when
leadership changed.
Similarly, China was able to escape from poverty and persistent
economic stagnation by Deng Xiao Ping's practical philosophy and
innovative economic policy, not by archaic Confucianism.
Let me summarize an interesting column of 'Swaminomics' from
The Sunday Times of India (March 9, 2003).
For three decades after independence, India so consistently averaged GDP growth of 3.5% per year.... in the 1980s India graduated to
the range 5-6%, though unsustainably: The borrowing spree that
financed this ended in tears in 1991. Economic reform followed, and
growth exceeded 7%.... Indian fiscal deficit of 10% of GDP, the second highest in the world after Turkey. ... But Singh's overspending is
offset by the bonanza from abroad. Flood of remittance coming from
Indians overseas along with increase of SW exports... And yet this
equilibrium comes at a price. If the huge inflow from abroad was harnessed to productive investment instead of government overspending,
our GDP growth could accelerate to 7% annually. Eventually, we
could match China's 8% growth rate.

As shown above, we can confirm again that growth and development take place only when good policy along with purposive and incorruptible leadership, apart from Values of Confucianism, is adopted. That
is to say, if the Indian Finance Minister Singh's budget were more sober,
notwithstanding the pressure of politics, the Indian growth rate should
be much higher.
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister after independence,
adopted a socialistic type of mixed economy and this turned out to be a
gravely flawed decision for India's future. A vast area of the national
economy was put under state control: the system recklessly wasted taxpayers' money and recklessly hired workers without any thought to performance. Most big and important companies were state-owned, managed by civil servants who had no training in running businesses at all.
This encouraged India to become a so-called, "license-permit-quota
Raj" and "rent-seeking society." It was the bad decision Nehru made,
not values or religion, that failed to get India out of miserable poverty.23
The successful agricultural reform of India in the 1960s has made
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India the only developing country in the world to build a solid system
of food security. Foreign institutional investors entered India in the
early 1990s; the Indian government upgraded the stock market to be
more competitive and transparent; and, as a result, India now has one of
the best and most modern stock exchanges in the developing world.
Among others, economic growth in India has been accelerated rapidly
since it transferred the state-control economy into an open and market
system in 1991.
The success story of recent Ireland is a very interesting case of
development. Among European countries, Ireland remained poor until
the 1980s. Although neither a Protestant nor a Confucian country, it has
grown as one of the richest economies in the world now. This development was achieved by a combination of cooperation between employers and workers, utilization of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), a pool
of well educated workers, plus the government's leadership and wise
decision-making.
The examples above are the evidence that economic success is
determined by policy, institutions, and leadership. Conversely, the case
of Indonesia in the late 1990s demonstrates how bad policy and inadequate measures for coping with economic crisis expedited instability
and degradation of economic condition.
The growth rates of several major Latin American countries in the
1960s and early 1970s were as high as the four East Asian "tigers," but
soon their economies plummeted. It was because they indulged in reckless spending and giveaway sprees, remaining uncommitted to production and productivity improvement under twisted political leadership.
Finally they began to borrow from Wall Street to patch up imminent
holes in their fiscal deficits. In contrast, East Asian leadership confined
the borrowed money for use exclusively as production investment. With
no improvement in productivity along with ever-increasing giveaways,
both deficits and foreign loans snowballed, which eventually led them
to disaster. This is a matter of the decision making of a leader, not a matter of culture or values, either.
As the column of Swaminomics stresses, "All political parties talk
of the need to accelerate GDP growth to 7-8% annually to eradicate
poverty and catch up with China. But no party is interested in taking the
tough measures needed for that." Enforcing good policy is truly an onerous job for political leaders. Great leaders are admired since the job is
extraordinarily difficult to fulfill.
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Now let us talk about the "Asian Values" again. Pre-emptive social
change is needed to launch the development of capitalism, and once a
society is developed, that development brings further changes. In this
context, one must keep in mind that Confucianism by nature discourages social change and is not compatible with the changes that development brings. It is a philosophy designed to keep the polity and society
of ancient Chinese despotism from changing. To them, change was
nothing but decay. Asia's distinctiveness, on which Asian Values advocates focus, are just vestiges of Confucianism, with only some fractions
congruent with capitalistic industrialism that were left over and fostered
in societies with less mature markets. Confucianism rather served to
build a personality-cult, such as in the feudalistic Communist state in
North Korea.24
How is it possible that the same Confucianism has facilitated a
society to be retrogressive and reclusive as is the Communist state in the
North while simultaneously promoting capitalism in the South? The
two Koreas stand at extreme poles; a few millions of people have died
from famine during the past several years in the North, whereas people
worry about excessive nutrition and care about diet in the South.
Some would oppose this view on the ground that Asians constitute
a conspicuously wealthy ethnic group among diverse minorities in the
U. S. If a certain ethnic group in a society is much better off than others, one may argue that it should be explained in view of cultural traits
or feature of values of the group's ethnic origin25. But, I believe such
phenomena are not sufficient to contradict the hypothesis of this paper.
Hispanics, a big minority in the U. S., are mostly Catholic—but many
Catholic states in other parts of the world are not poor.
Das, the author of the book India Unbound, who defines himself a
skeptic on cultural and geographical explanations, gives us his observations as follows: 26
In my experience, successful Hindu entrepreneurs can be both
extremely religious and aggressive in business. The Indian farmer
responds quickly to market-based incentives, as the green revolution
demonstrates. Brahmins will plow their own land in Uttar Pradesh if
they have to, and conservative Rajput Thakurs in Rajasthan will shed
their feudal ways for the sake of a commercial opportunity.
Moreover, there are substantial non-Hindus in India and these communities have also been stuck in the same rut of stagnation. ...
Tropical, enervating Singapore has achieved Western level of prosperity despite the unfairness of nature.
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I assume that a large number of Asians, when they left home for
America, were already very highly educated and from upper-middleclass families, whereas immigrants from other areas are mostly little
educated blue-collar workers. Many Asians migrated to America for a
better quality of life, whereas Hispanics and other minorities moved to
the country seeking jobs for survival. Why Asian-Americans are
wealthy has a very weak link to the indigenous culture of their origin.
We must also be aware that "Asia's distinctiveness" is already on
its way to erosion, which is being accelerated. Since rapid globalization
favors rule of law, transparency, fair competition, etc., such new norms
in conformity with market principles are being inexorably expedited.
V. Development in Europe vs. in Asia
Industrialization in Asian countries was achieved through learning;
they enjoyed the advantages of late comers. There was already a system
that they could adapt. Foreign savings and advanced technology were
widely available when they began to be attentive to economic development in the 1950s and 60s. Therefore, leadership and the leaders' proper decision makings were essential for development. They had to determine how best to use foreign savings and technology, provide profitable
opportunities to producers, and stimulate them to innovate.
By contrast, economic development in the West was spontaneously achieved on the basis of preconditions for industrialization, such as a
variety of social, political and economic institutions, attitudes which
permitted people to respond to technological opportunities.
The preconditions and subsequent industrialization in Europe were
the results of steady but undramatic technological and organizational
change. The medieval agricultural economy preceded industrialization
and the most important agricultural innovation was the substitution of
three-course crop rotation for the classical two-course rotation. This
was closely associated with two other significant innovations, the introduction of a heavy wheeled plow and the use of horses as draft animals.27 These innovations improved productivity and resulted in surpluses, which supported the growth of urbanization, most notably in
Southern Europe along the coast of the Mediterranean in the 14"1 century. Thereafter, development of navigational and related techniques permitted the discovery of the previously unknown world, i.e., America
and the Orient, and prompted the emergence of towns and commerce in
Western Europe.
Early medieval Europe was founded upon a static order of Estates,
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sanctioned by the Church. Christian Values, like classical
Confucianism, were static and antithetical to change. Everyone was
assigned to his place by nature, i.e. by God himself, and any attempt to
break away from it was a revolt against the divine order 28
However, a new class of bourgeoisie was formed, on the twin props
of money and intellect of liberal character, as a result of the development of trade and market. The new liberal mode of thought produced
the emancipated individual who had a realistic, not religious, worldview. This change had become the basis of the Renaissance and the subsequent Reformation. After the Reformation, money and market, which
had not been highly valued previously, gained the support of the
Protestant Church.
This is one of the reasons why Weber explained that Protestantism
was a cause for the rise of Capitalism. What he overlooked, however,
was the fact that it was a newly adopted value, revised from classical
Christian ethics. There are no permanent values or ethics that never
change and keep their original shape for ever. This means that even
some ethics or values of today that hinder the development of a society
are most likely to be modified in accordance with progress if situations
turn to be different. I don't believe that any one culture has a monopoly
on positive development.
From the Renaissance and the Reformation until the 18lh century,
the second phase of steady but undramatic change took place, culminating in the Industrial Revolution and the adoption of new social and
political institutions.
For example, in Victorian Britain, a breakthrough came when a
series of Companies Acts facilitated the creation of limited liability
companies that could harness the savings of households. For the first
time in history, entities other than kings and aristocrats were able to
become economic power centers. This transformed the world. And the
transformation has been accelerated ever since by a market that provides appropriate rewards to producers of needed goods and services.
Development of the West, in contrast to Asia, would be summarized as a fruit of technology and scientific theories that formed the
basis of production process. But an answer to a question of why the
technological and scientific revolution rose first in the West may be a
topic for another paper.
V. Conclusion
Those who attempt to refute Weber's contradiction indulge in the
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same kind of error that Weber committed. Weber, interpreting European
capitalistic development as an outcome of Protestant ethics, denied the
possibility of development of other cultures. Likewise, Asian Value proponents, viewing East Asian development as an exceptionalism, deny
future development in the areas of other cultures than Confucianism.
Even if they don't declare it explicitly, the logic is embedded in the context.
Let us suppose that the theses concerning Asian Values were verified by empirical tests or analysis; then we would have no ground for
hope for India, because their values are based on Hinduism, not
Confucianism. Does this sound plausible? In ten or twenty years, when
undeniable progress takes a place in India (nobody denies India is a
newly emerging economic power today), would the proponents of the
"Asian Values" thesis then call it "Indian Values'" or "Hindu Values?"
The cultural explanations of development focus on uniqueness rather
than universality and ignore the fact that human beings are similar
through history and the world over in their attentiveness to signals,
incentives, and disincentives concerning opportunities for profit and
prospects for loss.
Culture or values may encourage development but help only when
traditional ones transform to be congruent with development. In
Europe, divine and authoritarian mediaeval values changed to be coolly calculative and real as the center of gravity of the Middle Ages was
transferred from agriculture into urban commerce and manufacturing.
This change appeared for the first time in Italy and the outstanding
model was in Florence. It was the first cultural and social breach
between Middle Ages and modern times and finally in the eighteenth
century, the democratic and free ideology of the bourgeoisie was established.
Economic development versus change of ideology had been reciprocal and it took several centuries for the bud to blossom.
In Asia, by contrast, an agricultural economy continued until
recently and traditional ideas stood intact. To have ideas match with
new phenomena, the destruction of old ideas was inevitable: original
Asian Values, if anything such as these exist, are the ones that should be
destroyed as far as development and progress is sought. In the case of
Korea, there have been continuous endeavors to wipe out the old values
and ideas to meet the demands of market economy, but the speed of economic progress has been faster than the change of ideas and values.
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